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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 2003, Raymond Melton was convicted and sentenced for lewd conduct with a
child under the age of sixteen. His sentence was affirmed on direct appeal in 2004.
Also in 2004, Mr. Melton filed a petition for post-conviction relief asserting
numerous claims for relief, including certain claims related to his assertion that his minor
victim's preliminary hearing testimony and other statements had been coerced and
coached by the State. Mr. Melton was appointed counsel and provided an evidentiary
hearing; however, his post-conviction counsel failed to offer adequate evidence (such
as the testimony of the victim, her mother, or any of the persons who were involved in
coercinglcoaching her testimony) at the evidentiary hearing to allow Mr. Melton to
prevail on his coercion/coaching-relatedclaims.
In 2006, just months after his first post-conviction case was finally resolved,
Mr. Meiton filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief and again requested the
appointment of counsel. In his successive petition, Mr. Melton reiterated his claims
regarding the State's coercion/coaching of his victim and asserted that his successive
petition was properly filed because his post-conviction counsel had inadequately
asserted those claims in his first post-conviction case. He supported his successive
petition not only with his own affidavit, but with two letters from his victim stating that
she had lied at the behest of the State. and that she had done so because of the
harassment and intimidation of the prosecutor and other members of the prosecution
team.

Without addressing Mr. Melton's motion for appointment of counsel, the district
court summarily dismissed Mr. Melton's successive petition. Mr. Melton then initiated
the present appeal.
On Appeal, Mr. Melton contends that the district court erred in two respects: first,
the district court erred in failing to grant, or even rule upon, his motion for appointment
of counsel before summarily dismissing his successive petition; second, the district
court erred in summarily dismissing his successive petition. Mr. Melton contends that
these errors necessitate a remand of his case to the district court for appointment of
counsel and an evidentiary hearing on his claims.
In response, the State addresses Mr. Melton's second claim first, arguing that
summary dismissal of Mr. Melton's successive petition was proper because: (A) the
successive petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata (Respondent's Brief, pp.711); (B) the successive petition was really a thinly disguised motion for a new trial and,
thus, was untimely and without an adequate legal basis (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13);
(C) Mr. Melton had no legal basis to file a successive petition ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel at an earlier evidentiary hearing is not a "sufficient reason" to
file a successive petition under I.C.

3 19-4908 (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-17); (D)

Mr. Melton's successive petition was untimely because it was not filed within a year of
completion of his direct appeal (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-19); and (E) Mr. Melton's
petition did not raise a genuine issue of material fact with regard to an issue which, if
resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief (Respondent's brief, pp.19-23).
With regard to Mr. Melton's first claim, the State refers back to its previous arguments
about why it believes Mr. Melton's successive petition was meritless and argues that

either "there was no basis for appointment of counsel in his case" and, thus, the failure
to rule on the motion prior to summary dismissal was harmless. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.23-26.)
The present Reply is necessary to respond briefly to some of the State's
arguments.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedincls
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in
Mr. Melton's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, need not be repeated herein.

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in failing to grant, or even rule upon, Mr. Melton's motion
for appointment of counsel before summarily dismissing his successive petition
for post-conviction relief?

2.

Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Melton's successive petition
for post-conviction relief?

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred In Failing To Carefullv Consider, And Grant, Mr. Melton's
Motion For Appointment Of Counsel
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Melton argued that the district court erred in two
respects when it failed to rule on his motion for appointment of counsel (thereby
effectively denying that motion) before summarily dismissing his successive petition for
post-conviction relief. He argued first that the district court's failure to even rule on his
motion for appointment of counsel constituted error under Charboneau v. Stafe, 140
ldaho 789, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004). (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-19.) Next, he argued that
under Charboneau and Swader v. Stafe, 143 ldaho 651, 152 P.3d 12 (2007), the
effective denial of that motion was erroneous because he had raised the possibility of a
valid claim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-20.)
In response, the State argues that Mr. Melton's successive petition was meritless
and, therefore, "there was no basis for appointment of counsel in his case" and the
district court's failure to rule on the motion prior to summary dismissal was harmless.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.23-26.)
Because the State's claim that Mr. Melton's successive petition was meritless is
thoroughly refuted in Mr. Melton's Appellant's Brief, and in Part 11, below, no further
reply is necessary

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissina Mr. Melton's Successive Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
As noted, the State offers a host of reasons why it believes that Mr. Melton's
successive petition for post-conviction relief was meritless and, thus, was properly
summarily dismissed by the district court. Most of the State's arguments are adequately
addressed in Mr. Melton's opening brief (see Appellant's Brief, pp.21-34); however,
some of the State's contentions require additional discussion.

That discussion is

provided below.
A.

The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Did Not Bar The Claims Presented In Mr. Melton's
Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Melton, citing I.C. § 19-4908, Griffin v. State, 142

Idaho 438, 128 P.3d 975 (Ct. App. 2006), and a number of other cases, argued that
there is no per se rule against re-litigating previously-considered post-conviction claims,
and that such claims can be re-raised in a successive petition for post-conviction relief if
there is a "sufficient reason" why those claims were inadequately presented in the first
post-conviction case. (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25 & n.21.)

In response, the State

argues that Mr. Melton is wrong, and that, in fact, all previously-litigated post-conviction
claims are res judicata, and thus off-limits for a successive petition for post-conviction
relief. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-1I.) This argument, however, is specious.
First, if res judicafa were to apply to inadequately presented post-conviction
claims, a portion of I.C. § 19-4908 ("unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted
which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application"), and the cases interpreting that language

holding that a "sufficient reason" includes the ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel (such as Griffin), would be nullified.
Second, although the State finds it compelling that "Griffin does not discuss the
doctrine of resjudicafa, let alone any exceptions to it," apparently believing that this lack
of discussion of res judicata is a basis for distinguishing that case from this one, the
State overlooks the fact that the reason Griffin does not discuss the res judicata doctrine
is because it is so clearly inapplicable in the present case.
Third, to the extent that the State attempts to distinguish Griffin on its facts, that
attempt is unpersuasive. It is true that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel
complained of in Griffin arose prior to an evidentiary hearing, whereas the
ineffectiveness complained of in this case arose at the evidentiary hearing. However,
that is a distinction without a difference because the res judicafa doctrine, which holds
that "a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out
of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of action arose,"
Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 ldaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990), makes
no distinction between final judgments that come about by means of summary judgment
and those that come about following trial. In other words, because a final decision as to
the factual contentions of the parties is not a prerequisite to application of the res
judicata doctrine, see Duthie v. Lewisfon Gun Club, 104 ldaho 751, 753-54, 663 P.2d
287, 289-90 (1983) ("[Rles judicata applies to every matter which might and should
have been litigated in the first suit whether or not it was raised in the pleadings."), the
State's attempt to say that the res judicata applies precisely because Mr. Melton's
factual contentions were addressed by the district court finds no basis in the law. The

bottom line is that res judicata has been pre-empted by I.C. § 19-4908 in post-conviction
cases.
B.

Mr. Melton's Successive Petition Was Correctlv Styled A Successive Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief
Another argument presented by the State is that Mr. Melton's successive petition

was really a thinly disguised motion for a new trial and, thus, was untimely and without
an adequate legal basis. (Respondent's Brief, pp.ll-13.) This, however, is nothing but
a "straw man" argument.
The State argues, in wholly conclusory fashion, that the substance of
Mr. Meiton's successive petition was really a request for a new trial under Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure 59(a) andlor 60(b). (Respondent's Brief, p.1I . ) After making that
bald assertion, the State then offers the myriad of reasons why it believes Mr. Melton's
petition would fail under those rules (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-13), not the least of
which is that Mr. Melton's claims are not cognizable under either Rule 59(a) or 60(b)
(Respodent's Brief, p.12).
The fundamental problem with the State's argument, of course, is that
Mr. Melton's successive petition clearly was not brought pursuant to Rules 59(a) or
60(b); it was properly brought pursuant to I.C. 3 19-4908. Moreover, the State's attempt
to claim otherwise is illogical given that, if we assume that the claims raised in
Mr. Melton's successive petition are not cognizable under Rules 59(a) and 60(b), then
there is no basis for the State to argue that, despite the styling of Mr. Melton's
successive petition, the substance of that petition is really a motion for a new trial.

Although the State has done a fine job job knocking down its "straw man,"
Mr. Melton asks this Court to disregard that argument entirely, as it has nothing
whatsoever to do with this case.
C.

Ineffective Assistance Of Post-Conviction Counsel Is A "Sufficient Reason" To
File A Successive Petition Under I.C. 6 19-4908
The State also attempts to argue that Mr. Melton's successive petition is barred

because:
there are only two instances in which ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel might constitute 'sufficient reason' for permitting the
petitioner to file a claim in a successive petition: (1) where a claim raised
in the original pro se petition was omitted from the amended petition filed
by court-appointed counsel without the petitioner's knowledge or consent,
or (2) where the petitioner's unadjudicated claim was lost or forfeited due
to counsel's failure to respond to the district court's notice of intent to
dismiss. . . .
(Respondent's Brief, p.17 (citation omitted).) This, however, is an overly narrow view of
I.C. § 19-4908.
While the State may very well be correct in its assertion that "[nlo case
interpreting I.C.

19-4908 has permitted a petitioner to have a new post-conviction

evidentiary hearing based upon a claim that the attorney failed to present enough
evidence at the fist post-conviction evidentiary" (Respondent's Brief, p.17), such a lack
of published decisions does not mean that I.C. § 19-4908 cannot be read to allow
successive petitions based on the ineffective assistance provided at a prior evidentiary
hearing. Indeed, section 19-4908 is couched in relatively broad terms, speaking of a
"sufficient reason" why a ground for relief was "inadequately raised," I.C. $j19-4908, and
the State offers no principled reason why this broad language should be given such an
artificially restrictive construction. Moreover, in Palmer v. Dermiff, 102 Idaho 591, 596,

635 P.2d 955, 960 (1981), one of the cases relied upon by the State for its argument on
this point, the ldaho Supreme Court cited, with approval, to Sims v. State, 295 N.W.2d
420, 422-23 (lowa 1980), a case in which the lowa Supreme Court implicitly recognized
(but considering petitioner's claims on their merits) that ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel at an evidentiary hearing is a "sufficient reason" for "inadequately
raising" an issue and, thus, justifies the filing of a successive petition.' Thus, the best
interpretation of I.C. § 19-4908 and Palmer is that any ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel-regardless
the evidentiary hearing-is
D.

of whether it occurs prior to the evidentiary hearing or at

a "sufficient reason" justifying a successive petition.

Mr. Melton's Successive Petition Was Timelv Filed
Another argument raised by the State is that Mr. Melton's successive petition

was untimely because it was not filed within a year of completion of his direct appeal.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 18-19.) This argument is also without merit.
Although the State cites Hernandez v. State, 133 ldaho 794, 992 P.2d 789
(Ct. App. 1999), it fails to recognize that that case refutes its argument. In Hernandez,
the Court of Appeals adopted a "relation-back doctrine for successive petitions and
held "that one year is a reasonable time for an inmate in these circumstances to
proceed with a successive post-conviction relief action if the initial action was dismissed
due to the ineffective assistance from the attorney representing the inmate in that
proceeding." Hernandez, 133 ldaho at 794, 992 P.2d at 799. It further held that,
because the petitioner had filed his successive petition less than a year after the

' lowa has also adopted the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

See IOWA
CODE
ANN. §§ 822.1 through .11. Accordingly, Iowa's statute governing successive petitions
is virtually identical to Idaho's. Compare I.C. 3 19-4908 with IOWA CODEANN.
§ 822.8.
10

disposition of the appeal of the first post-conviction case, the successive petition was
not time-barred. Id.; see also Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870,
875 (2007) (holding that successive petitions in non-capital cases must be filed within a
"reasonable time" of the petitioner's becoming aware of his claim, and that thirteen
months was not reasonable under the facts of that case).
With regard to Mr. Melton's situation, the Remittitur in his first post-conviction
appeal was issued on March 22, 2006 (R., p.75), and he filed his successive petition
(and the memorandum in support thereof) just over a month later, on April 24, 2006
( R , I - 1 1 Accordingly, his successive petition was filed in a "reasonable time" and
was, therefore, timely.
E.

Mr. Melton's Successive Petition Raised Genuine Issues Of Material Fact
Finally, the State contends that Mr. Melton's successive petition was properly

summarily dismissed because it did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to an
issue which, if resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.19-23.)

This argument, however, because it is based on the State's

misinterpretation of applicable standards, and a lot of fanciful speculation, is also
without merit.
First, while the State correctly observes that Mr. Melton did not support his
successive petition with affidavits from the individuals who could have testified at his
evidentiary hearing about the prosecutor's coercion and coaching of C.M.'s testimony
(C.M. herself, Tammy Blevins, Alisa Moon, Ron Gear, and Phillip Brown), this is not a
deficiency which should have warranted summary dismissal since, when he filed his
successive petition, Mr. Melton was in a situation where obtaining those affidavits would

have been virtually impossible. Not only was he incarcerated (R., p.l), but he was also
under an order not to have any contact with either C.M. or Ms. Blevins (Melton I, Sent.
Tr., p.59, Ls.11-16). Moreover, as noted, his motion for appointment of counsel had
been ignored by the district court. As the ldaho Supreme Court has recently noted,
"[aln indigent defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost certainly
be unable to conduct an investigation into facts not already contained in the court
record." Swader v. State, 143 ldaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d f2, 15 (2007).
Second, the State asserts that "it must be presumed that prior post-conviction
counsel concluded that calling C.M. and her mother [Tammy Blevins] would have been
fruitless."

(Respondent's Brief, p.21.) However, that argument represents a gross

misstatement of the law. In fact, at the summary dismissal stage, all of Mr. Melton's
allegations should have been taken as true, and all reasonable inferences should have
been drawn in his favor. Small

v. Sfafe,

132 ldaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155

(Ct. App. 1998).
Third, while the State speculates that post-conviction counsel "did not call the
alleged witnesses because they would not support" Mr. Melton's claims (Respondent's
Brief, p.21), that is precisely the type of inference that the district court was not
permitted to draw in weighing the summary dismissal question. See id. Likewise, while
the State opines that "[plrior post-conviction counsel would have been justified in
determining that calling C.M., Tammy Blevins, Alisa Moon, Ron Gear, and Phillip Brown
as witnesses at the evidentiary hearing in Melton's prior post-conviction case was
irrelevant followings Melton's admission that his daughter's statement . . . was true"
(Respondent's Brief, p.22), there is no evidence to support the inference that that was

post-conviction counsel's thought process and, thus, such an inference was
impermissible. See Small, 132 Idaho at 331, 971 P.2d at 1155.
Fourth, the State is incorrect when it asserts that letters, written by C.M.,
indicating that her testimony had been coerced and coached, did not support
Mr. Melton's claim that his post-conviction counsel had rendered ineffective assistance.
(See Respondent's Brief, pp.21-22.)

Those letters, even if they have not yet been

proven to have been in post-conviction counsel's possession at the time of Mr. Melton's
evidentiary hearing, support Mr. Melton's contention that post-conviction counsel knew
or should have known that there was additional evidence out there which, if accepted by
the district court, would have provided a basis for post-conviction relief. Thus, those
letters, taken in conjunction with Mr. Melton's own sworn statements, are sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to his post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in his Appellant's Brief,
Mr. Melton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his Successive Petition and remand his case with an instruction
that counsel be appointed and that the district court conduct an evidentiary hearing.
' ~
of April, 2008.
DATED this 2 ~day

.. .-7

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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